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other is Baron Jomini's *Étude Diplomatique sur la Guerre de la Crimée* (two volumes, St. Petersburg, 1878), which as Friedjung himself tells us was prepared under Gortschakoff's direction in order to make out a case against Austria. The dispatches from the Austrian ministers abroad seem to be got mainly from the memoirs, etc., of these individuals; it will be remembered however that in almost every case these diplomats were partisans then and later, and that they published their diplomatic remains with controversial intent.

One would be almost justified in dismissing a study set before us in this manner with the remark that it is impossible to judge of its value. But after reading the book this seems too cavalier a proceeding with what is evidently not only a serious study but a remarkably effective one. It is a very clear and judicious analysis of the curious conditions of the conduct of Austrian foreign relations in the years 1853-1856; a most tangled web is handled with great skill and precision. On the whole the previously prevailing conclusions are not disturbed; though there is much additional light as to detail and some shifting of emphasis. That the Austrian administration was in incapable hands, that Austrian counsels were divided, that the Austrian policy was selfish and timid in the extreme, that nearly all the other powers were in turn alienated and that Austria emerged isolated in Europe; all this we knew before. But we are here given a careful analysis of the contending elements, and explanations of the Austrian point of view and of the unlucky turns through which the Austrian aims and methods were doomed constantly to make the worst possible impression. It is purely a diplomatic study, concerned wholly with those who conducted foreign relations for the moment; no information will be found on any other sides of the Austrian conditions. Necessarily it is to a considerable degree a study not only of the Austrian but of the European diplomacy of the Crimean War. While the book cannot be conclusive or even of great authority, it is of much interest and suggestiveness; the treatment is objective and the tone judicial, and in all probability the analysis of the situation and the representation of the course of events are entirely trustworthy. If this special study marks Herr Friedjung's transition from popular to scientific work, historical science may well welcome the accession; with however the warning that the passage does not appear to be yet fully accomplished.

VICTOR COFFIN.

La France et Guillaume II. Par VICTOR BÉRARD. (Paris: Armand Colin. 1907. Pp. ix, 315.)

M. VICTOR BÉRARD has brought together under the title *La France et Guillaume II.* a series of papers on Franco-German relations, which have already appeared in the *Revue de Paris*. It does not pretend to be a systematic treatise on diplomacy nor an impartial examination of the policy and measures of the German Emperor. It is on the

contrary an argument against the economic stability of Germany and a diatribe against the "Machiavellian" and "treacherous" diplomacy of Berlin—clear, suggestive, and entertaining, but hardly destined to escape the oblivion that overwhelms things printed. By conviction, M. Bérard is against imperialism of the Chamberlain and Rhodes type, but with Mr. Hobson and Mr. Reinsch he understands the pitiless pressure of economic forces in the expansion of Western Nations and he wastes no time on beatific dreams of *la petite France*. He studies the relations of France and the Emperor in the light of the conflict of interests in the world market-place.

His volume falls into three parts, the first of which is devoted to an examination of French colonial and foreign policy, French economic activities so far as they are related to external politics and finally the exigencies of French finance. On the first of the three points, he warns his countrymen that they have an eastern frontier as well as colonies and that they must keep their powder dry. He therefore rejoices in the Anglo-French *entente cordiale*, which has a foundation deeper than sentiment in reciprocal economic advantages. The German monopolists, he declares, are at cross purposes with the civilized world; their commerce and industry are in conflict with England and the United States; and their agriculture clashes with that of Russia and Austria. On finance and diplomacy, M. Bérard is more eloquent than convincing; he scorns the financiers and holders of foreign securities who sacrifice the honor and true interests of their country rather than endure a decline in stocks, but he will hardly keep them out of politics by suggesting that patriotism and poverty are more to be desired than truckling diplomacy and great riches. He admits that the exigencies of high finance were responsible for the resignation of Delcassé in the recent affair with Germany over Morocco—an affair which, he believes, will mark a turning-point in the national life of France.

M. Bérard's second book contains an analysis of German foreign and commercial policy as exemplified in South American enterprises—especially in the development of Venezuelan resources. The conclusion so far as the German emperor is concerned was foregone: brutality is odious to the French—they hold with the old-fashioned English radical that force is not a remedy. The German emperor, however, is troubled with no such scruples: "alors que l'humanité entière se met en marche vers une justice plus équitable, vers une paix fondée sur le droit, vers un bonheur démocratique, le seul Guillaume II. croit son destin lié à défense des vieilles choses, des crimes hamidiens, de la barbarie marocaine, de l'autocratie tsarienne, du 'péril jaune,' de la misère chinoise, de caporalisme, de la monarchie de droit divin". Despite this fact, however, the emperor's militarism and bravado will not avail him anything, because the competition of other nations brings ruin to German industries; the great Brazilian paradise has proved a desert and German trade with it fails to fulfil expectations; the other South Amer-

ican republics are hornets' nests guarded by the Yankee; Finland and Poland may become autonomous, Russia constitutional, Austria democratic and modern, Hungary and Slavonia federal, and the Balkans free and reformed;—finally the whole world except the Sultan is alarmed at his pretentious imperialism.

M. Bérard concludes with an examination of *Menaces et Offres Allemandes*, taking as his text a speech by von Bülow to the effect that any attempts to construct a circle of antagonistic powers and thus isolate Germany would be dangerous to the peace of Europe. This, according to our author, is just what is most likely to happen. A mutual understanding between Russia, England, and France is one of the probabilities of the near future, and Denmark and Norway will turn toward the west rather than to Prussian tyranny. The union of southern Europe will be even more easily accomplished: the Triple Alliance will die; German competition weighs heavily on Italian industries and shipping; Hungary rising rapidly to a position of industrial independence will resist the tutelage of both Vienna and Berlin; in the contest for the Levant trade, the merchants of Fiume and Trieste find formidable competitors in the ubiquitous German and no mere political alliance can effectively withstand the strain of trade war. Slavs, Magyars, and Latins are destined to be linked by economic interests and the future seems a happy one for the Frenchman. If brilliant hypothesis, carefully selected statistics, and ardent hopes were conclusive, this would be an impressive book. Whether its thesis is a prophecy or a delusion, the future alone can decide.

CHARLES A. BEARD.

BOOKS OF AMERICAN HISTORY

Letters and Recollections of George Washington. Edited by LOUISA LEAR EYRE. (New York: Doubleday, Page and Company. 1906. Pp. xi, 289.)

George Washington, Patriot, Soldier, Statesman, First President of the United States. By JAMES A. HARRISON. (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons. 1906. Pp. xxiii, 481.)

MRS. EYRE'S volume comprises ninety-one letters from Washington to her grandfather, Tobias Lear, between the years 1790 and 1799, Lear's account of the last days of Washington, and one hundred and thirty-nine letters from Washington to various persons on matters connected with the private life of the writer of them. Very few of the letters in the book are included in either Ford's or Sparks's collections, no doubt for the reason that they do not deal with the more important public phase of the life of Washington. Moreover, most of them have been printed hitherto in special editions, which are not readily accessible to the student. Their publication in this popular form will confer a favor, therefore, on the public, although the present edition has the